The method of retroactive legislative regulation has always raised many questions and has become the subject of active discussions. In the Belgian legal system, this method takes various forms and usually assumes that through retroactive regulation by acts of a legislative or executive body, the State influences pending court proceedings.

The present judgment draws attention because the measure adopted in favour of the State for financial reasons was subject to verification for compliance with the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, despite convincing arguments about the existence of public interest. However, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly emphasised that financial interests alone do not justify the retroactive application of legislation, what violates the fundamental principle of legal certainty. At the same time, the applicants have reasonable expectations regarding the legality of their actions and the functioning of the judicial system. Changing the regulatory act undermines these expectations. A retrospective regulation is available only to the Government and such a unilateral act does not comply with the principle of equality of the parties. In view of the above, the Court adopted the criterion of “valid reasons” in order to exclude in the future an easy way of its application by national legislatures. The Court's practice previously ruled out the possibility of establishing the expiration of limitation period by a court decision. Meanwhile, in contrast to the previous position, the Court introduced a new criterion that allows a judicial decision to restore it, which does not fully correspond to the very essence of the institution.

In this case, the Court did not follow its well-established case law and improved the verification test regarding the insurmountable nature of the interests mentioned by the State. The complexity of the analysed decision is also in the fact that understanding the requirements of the changing context in each particular case makes it difficult to apply the standards of a universal approach in order to preserve legal certainty. These features may also cause difficulties in implementing the principle in various legal systems.