Constitutional Status of Central Banks: A Comparative Study
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Constitutional Status of Central Banks: A Comparative Study
Abstract
PII
S1991-32220000622-3-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Mekhti Mekhtiev 
Occupation: Leading Researcher, Center of International Law and Comparative Legal Studies
Affiliation: Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation
Address: Moscow, Russia
Edition
Pages
26-36
Abstract

The article is devoted to the legal status of a central bank in the context of its exclusive authority to conduct monetary policy. Since the very beginning of their (central banks) creation in 17th century their role is either way to organise money turnover aimed at stabilizing prices or interest rates. To date, most constitutions adopted over the past 30 years have consolidated not only the status of the central bank, but also its main and exclusive mandate — stabilization of the monetary system. This trend leads to its autonomy and independence. However, the evolution of legislation in this area continues to develop rapidly.

The main method used to study the legal status of the central bank is comparative legal and historical legal analysis. For this purpose, basic laws of Western states are evaluated as they are the oldest legal mechanisms and turns to be a universal approach. Also, legislations of developing countries are selected to identify alternative vectors of constitutional legislation development, which establish the fundamentals of the monetary system regulation. Finally, the Russian legislation in this field is analysed in connection to constitutional amendments in 2020.

In result the study demonstrates the general characteristics that constitutional legislations have, the latest trends in this area and their further development perspectives. It is also revealed that there are internal contradictions within the latest trends in the development of legislation. On the one hand central banks’ powers expand and their independence strengthens. On the other hand they (central banks) must promote national general economic policies.

Keywords
constitutional law, central bank, exclusive powers, monetary policy
Date of publication
06.06.2024
Number of purchasers
3
Views
71
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