Additional sources and materials
1. Adrian T., Khan Kh., Menand L. A New Measure of Central Bank Independence. IMF Working Papers WP/24/35, 2024. 26 p.
2. Agur I., Capelle D., Dell’Ariccia J., Sandri D. Monetary Finance: Do Not Touch, or Handle with Care? January 13, 2022. 47 p. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2022/01/11/Monetary-Finance-Do-Not- Touch-or-Handle-with-Care-464862.
3. Archer D., Levin A. Robust Design Principles for Monetary Policy Committees. RBA Annual Conference Volume. Ed. by J. Simon. Sydney, 2019. Pp. 233—251.
4. Bernhard W. Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies. Michigan, 2002. 256 p.
5. Blanchflower D. G., Levin A. T. Monetary policy committees need reform to avoid groupthink and ensure sound decision-making. F&D Finance and Development, IMF Blog, March 2023. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/03/ diverse-views-in-monetary-policy-blanchflower-levin?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.
6. Blinder A. Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence. Business Economics, 2013, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 163—165.
7. Blinder A., Ehrmann M., Fratzscher M., Haan J., Jansen D. J. Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. ECB Working Paper. Series No. 898, 2008.
8. Crowe C., Meade E. E. Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness. IMF Working Paper. WP/08/119, 2008.
9. Dincera N. N., Eichengreen B. Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures. International Journal of Central Banking, 2014, vol. 10, no. 1.
10. Heckel M. The Bank of Japan — Institutional Issues of Delegation, Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy. July 29, 2014. 352 p. Available at: https://d-nb.info/1063278244/34.
11. Jordan T. J. Current challenges to central banks’independence: Speech at the Annual O. John Olcay Lecture on Ethics and Economics at the Peterson Institute. Washington, 11 October 2022. 8 p. Available at: https://www.bis.org/review/r221017n.pdf.
12. Marcussen M. Central Banks on the Move. Journal of European Public Policy, 2005, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 903—923.
13. Meade E. Chapter 3: Political framework and legal status. Issues in the Governance of Central Banks. Basel, 2009. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/othp04.pdf.
14. Napier C. Constitutional Options: Economic Provisions. May 2003. 14 p. Available at: https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/ files/Economicissues.napier.pdf.
15. Wachtel P., Blejer M. A Fresh Look at Central Bank Independence. Cato Journal, 2020, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 105—132.
16. Khabrieva T. Y. (ed.). Venice Commission on the problems of justice in the modern world: Collection of analytical materials of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Moscow, 2018. 456 p. (In Russ.)
17. Veremeeva O. V. Institutsional’nye predposylki upravleniya mezhdunarodnymi finansovymi riskami. Federalizm, 2015, no. 3, pp. 141—150.
18. Guznov A. G. The historical aspect of the foundation and development of Central Banks. Actual Problems of Russian Law, 2016, no. 3(64), pp. 71—80. (In Russ.) 19. Khabrieva T. Y. (ed.). Constitutions of African and Pacific States. Vol. 3. Moscow, 2019. 992 p.
20. Mekhtiev M. G. Protection of Social and Economic Rights in Conditions of Integration. Journal of Russian Law, 2024, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 136 — 151. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.61205/jrp.2024.2.6.
21. Mekhtiev M. G. Mezhdunarodno-pravovoe regulirovanie mekhanizmov preodoleniya defitsita platezhnogo balansa. Cand. diss. Moscow, 2021. 180 p.
22. Mekhtiev M. G. On the Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Program. Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law, 2020, no. 4, pp. 134—138. (In Russ.) DOI: 10.12737/ jflcl.2020.036.
23. Khabrieva T. Y., Kovler A. I. (eds). Modern Concepts of the Rule of Law and the Law-Governed State: a Comparative Legal Study. Moscow, 2024. 416 p.
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