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Prospects of the European Model of Constitutional Control
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Prospects of the European Model of Constitutional Control
Abstract
PII
S1991-32220000622-3-1
DOI
10.61205/jzsp.2024.1.2
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Rovshan Ismailov 
Occupation: Judge
Affiliation: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Address: Baku, Azerbaijan
Edition
Volume 20 No. 1
Pages
32-41
Abstract

The traditional perception of the European model of constitutional control was formed largely thanks to the Italian scientist Piero Calamandrei, who developed in the middle of the last century a classification of constitutional control, one of the most important elements of which is the opposition of centralized and decentralized models of constitutional control. This classification was based on the constitutional experience of a very limited number of states that provided the institution of constitutional control in their legal systems at that time. After several decades, the evolution of constitutional control in these countries, as well as its establishment and development in many other states, allows us to take a different look at some well-established concepts. In particular, the verification of constitutionality, carried out on the basis of appeals from courts of general jurisdiction, turned the monopoly of the constitutional court on the exercise of control over constitutionality into its monopoly on the mandatory recognition of the norm unconstitutional for the relevant subjects. In addition, the centralization of the European model is further weakened as a result of the interpretation of laws by courts of general jurisdiction in accordance with the constitution, which is essentially a “small” constitutional control designed to prohibit the unconstitutional content of the norm, rather than its text. The verification of “pre-constitutional” laws by courts of general jurisdiction, conducted in a number of countries, also indicates some decentralization of the European model. The existing practice in France of the relationship between the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Constitutional Council shows that in this country there are three independent supreme judicial bodies, each of which can interpret the Constitution independently.

Thus, the centralization of the European model is eroded by a number of decentralizing elements provided for both at the legislative level and introduced by the judicial practice of various constitutional courts.

Keywords
European model of constitutional control, centralized control, monopoly of the constitutional court on the exercise of constitutional control, constitutional-conformal interpretation, pre-constitutional laws, judicial interpretation
Date of publication
26.02.2024
Number of purchasers
6
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96
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